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Abstract
We introduce and study the game of “Selfish Cops and Active Robber” (SCAR) which
can be seen as an multiplayer variant of the “classic” two-player Cops and Robbers (CR)
game. In classic CR all cops are controlled by a single player, who has no preference over
which cop captures the robber. In SCAR, on the other hand, each of N − 1 cops is con-
trolled by a separate player, and a single robber is controlled by the N -th player; and the
capturing cop player receives a higher reward than the non-capturing ones. Consequently,
SCAR is an N -player pursuit game on graphs, in which each cop player has an increased
motive to be the one who captures the robber. The focus of our study is the existence and
properties of SCAR Nash Equilibria (NE). In particular, we prove that SCAR always has
one NE in deterministic positional strategies and (for N ≥ 3) another in deterministic non-
positional strategies. Furthermore, we study conditions which, at equilibrium, guarantee
either capture or escape of the robber and show that (because of the antagonism between
the “selfish” cop players) the robber may, in certain SCAR configurations, be captured
later than he would be in classic CR, or even not captured at all. Finally we define the
selfish cop number of a graph and study its connection to the classic cop number.
1 Introduction
In this note we introduce and study the game of “Selfish Cops and Active Robber” (SCAR)
which can be seen as an N-player variant of the “classic” two-player cops and robbers (CR)
game [1, 19].
The rules of SCAR are similar to those of CR: N − 1 cops and a robber take turns moving
along the edges of an undirected finite simple connected graph; the robber is captured if at the
end of a turn he is located in the same vertex as one or more cops.
However each cop in SCAR is a separate player (while in CR a single player controls all
cops). Furthermore, payoffs are quite different from those of CR. A complete description will be
given in Section 2; the gist of the matter (and the SCAR novelty) is that in SCAR the capturing
cops receive a higher reward than the remaining, non-capturing cops. As a result, one cop’s win
is another cop’s partial loss (as well as the robber’s complete loss).
∗The authors thank Steve Alpern and Pascal Schweitzer for several useful and inspiring discussions.
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In other words, while in SCAR (as in CR) the robber will try to maximize capture time,
each cop has a motive to minimize capture time and an additional motive for the capture to be
effected by himself; depending on some game parameters, situations will arise in which a cop will
enforce a longer capture time to ensure that he (rather than another cop) captures the robber.
Hence cop cooperation cannot be taken for granted (the cops are selfish); in this respect, SCAR
differs essentially from classic CR with a team of N − 1 cops chasing a single robber.
In short, SCAR is an N -player (with N ≥ 3) pursuit evasion game on graphs, where the
interests of each of the N players are in (partial or total) conflict with those of the remaining
players. To the best of our knowledge such games have not been previously studied.
As will become clear in the sequel, SCAR belongs to the extensively studied family of stochas-
tic games1. For two-player stochastic games see [7] and for the N -player case see [17, 25].
SCAR can also be seen as a pursuit / evasion game played on graphs. The prototypical game
of this family is, of course, the classic CR game introduced in [19, 21]; for an extensive recent
overview of the subject see the book [1]. While the connection between graph pursuit games
and game theory is a natural one, relatively little has been published on it [12, 13, 14, 16]. In
particular, we are aware of only one previous publication (by ourselves) on graph pursuit games
involving selfish pursuers [14].
Graph pursuit games are also related to several other research areas: reachability games [3,
15], recursive games [6, 25], combinatorial games (see [10, 20] and especially [2]) and differential
pursuit games [11]. It is worth noting that the idea of selfish pursuers has been occasionally
(but not extensively) explored in studies of differential pursuit games [9, 22, 24].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the necessary prelim-
inaries (rules, notation etc.) for the analysis of the three-player (two cops, one robber) SCAR.
In Section 3 we briefly present a game theoretic formulation of a slightly modified version of
the classic CR game; this formulation will be useful in the analysis of SCAR presented in later
sections. In Section 4 we prove that three-player SCAR admits Nash equilibria in deterministic
strategies and at least one of these is an equilibrium in positional strategies; we also prove several
additional properties, regarding the connection of SCAR capturability to the classic cop number.
In Section 5 we extend our results to N -player SCAR (with N ≥ 2), and we also define the
selfish cop number of a graph and study its connection to the classic cop number. We conclude,
in Section 6, by presenting variants and extensions of SCAR which can be the subject of future
work.
2 Preliminaries
We denote the SCAR game played by N players on G by ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε); s0 is the initial position
and γ, ε are game parameters which will be discussed in later sections. We will sometimes
simplify the notation to ΓN (G|s0) and / or ΓN (G).
The main task of this section is a rigorous definition of the three-player SCAR game Γ3 (G)
(the generalization to ΓN (G), the N -player case, will appear in Section 5).
1Actually all elements of SCAR are deterministic; the term “stochastic games” denotes a general game family
which contains, as a special case, games deterministically evolving in time.
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2.1 Basics
“Iff” means “if and only if”. The cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|; the set of elements of
A which are not elements of B is denoted by A\B. We use the following sets of integers:
N = {1, 2, 3, ...} , N0 = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} .
Given a graphG = (V,E), for any x ∈ V , N (x) is the neighborhood of x: N (x) = {y : {x, y} ∈ E};
N [x] is the closed neighborhood of x: N [x] = N (x) ∪ {x}.
2.2 States and Rules of Γ3 (G)
Γ3 (G) is played on a undirected, finite, simple connected graph G = (V,E). The first player
is the cop C1, the second player is the cop C2 and the third player is the robber R. Thus the
player set is I = {C1, C2, R} or, for simplicity, I = {1, 2, 3}.
The game is played in turns, numbered by the time index t ∈ N0. At the zero-th turn the
initial positions of the players are given. At every subsequent turn, a single player moves. Any
player can have the first move and they play in “cyclical” order ...→ C1 → C2 → R→ ... . The
game ends if the robber is captured, that is, if at the end of a turn he is located in the same
vertex as one or more cops. Otherwise it continues indefinitely.
A game position or game state has the form s = (x1, x2, x3, p) where xn ∈ V is the position
(vertex) of the n-th player and p ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the number of the player who has the next move.
The set of nonterminal states is
S ′ = V × V × V × {1, 2, 3} .
We will also need a terminal state τ . Hence the full state set is S = S ′ ∪ {τ}.
A partition of the state set can be effected as follows. Define (for each n ∈ I) the set Sn of
states in which the n-th player has the next move:2
Sn =
{
s : s =
(
x1, x2, x3, n
)
∈ S
}
.
Then the full state set can be partitioned as follows:
S = S ′ ∪ {τ} = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ {τ} . (1)
An alternative partition of the state set is effected as follows. We define capture state sets:
S1C =
{
s : s = (x1, x2, x3, n) with x1 = x3, x2 6= x3
}
, where R is captured by C1;
S2C =
{
s : s = (x1, x2, x2, n) with x1 6= x3, x2 = x3
}
, where R is captured by C2;
S12C =
{
s : s = (x1, x2, x2, n) with x1 = x3, x2 = x3
}
, where R is captured by both C1 and C2.
2Formally speaking and given that SCAR is a stochastic game (as noted before) at every turn all players
make a move. There is however at every turn a single player who has a non-trivial set of moves to choose among
these and this is what for reasons of brevity we mean in the current paper by the expression ”the player who
has the next move”.
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Now define:
SC = S
1
C ∪ S
2
C ∪ S
12
C , the set of all capture states;
SNC = S
′\SC , the set of all non-capture, non-terminal states.
Then the state set can be partitioned as follows:
S = S ′ ∪ {τ} = SNC ∪ SC ∪ {τ} . (2)
We define An (s), the n-th player’s action set when the game state is s = (x1, x2, x3, m), by
An (s) =

N [xn] for s ∈ Sn ∩ SNC ,
{xn} for s ∈ Sm ∩ SNC with n 6= m,
{λ} for s ∈ SC , where λ is the null move
{λ} for s = τ.
The players’ action sets have the following implications on state-to-state transitions:
1. when the n-th player has the move at a non-capture state, he can stay at his current vertex
or move to any neighboring vertex, thus producing the next state of the game;
2. when another player has the move at a non-capture state, the n-th player can only stay
in his current vertex (trivial move);
3. when the game is in a capture state, every player has only the null move and the game
moves to the terminal state;
4. when the game is in the terminal state, every player has only the null move and the game
moves to (actually stays in) the terminal state.
These state-to-state transitions are formalized by the transition function T (s, a) which denotes
the game state resulting when the game is at a position s ∈ S and each player n ∈ I makes
a move an ∈ An(s) resulting to the actions profile a = (a1, a2, a3). The behavior of T (s, a) is
illustrated by some examples as follows:
for s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 1
)
∈ S1 ∩ SNC : T
(
s, (a1, a2, a3)
)
=
(
a1, x2, x3, 2
)
,
for s =
(
x1, x2, x3, 2
)
∈ S2 ∩ SC : T (s, (λ, λ, λ)) = τ,
for s = τ : T (τ, (λ, λ, λ)) = τ.
Often we use the following simplified notation: if at t the game state is st = (x
1
t , x
2
t , x
3
t , n) ∈ S
n
and at t+ 1 the n-th player’s action is ant+1, we write
st+1 = T
(
st, a
n
t+1
)
.
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2.3 Histories and Strategies
A game history is a sequence h = (s0, s1, s2, ...), where st is the state of the game at the t-th
turn (t ∈ N0= {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}). We define the following history sets:
histories of length k : Hk = {h = (s0, s1, s2, ..., sk−1)},
histories of finite length : H∗ = ∪
∞
k=1Hk,
histories of infinite length : H∞ = {h = (s0, s1, ..., st, ...)}.
Histories of infinite length can be further partitioned as H∞ = HC ∪HNC where
histories where capture occurs : HC = {h = (s0, s1, ...) ∈ H∞ : ∃st ∈ SC},
histories where the robber evades indefinitely : HNC = {h = (s0, s1, ...) ∈ H∞ : ∄st ∈ SC}.
Furthermore, we define the capture time of history h ∈ H∞ as
TC(h) =
{
min {t : st ∈ SC} if h ∈ HC
∞ if h ∈ HNC .
We will often use the simpler notation TC , when the history is clear from the context. Now
consider the following cases.
1. If TC = 0 then the initial state is a capture state and st = τ for every t ∈ N = {1, 2, ...}.
2. If 0 < TC <∞ then:
(a) at the 0-th turn the game starts at some preassigned state s0 ∈ SNC ;
(b) at the t-th turn (for t ∈ {1, 2, ..., TC − 1}), the game moves to some state st ∈ SNC ;
(c) at the TC-th turn the game moves to some capture state sTC ∈ SC ;
(d) at the (TC + 1)-th turn the game moves to the terminal state and stays there for all
subsequent turns (for every t > TC , st = τ and the game effectively ends at time TC).
3. If TC =∞ then st ∈ SNC for every t ∈ N0.
The case s0 = τ is uninteresting and hence excluded from consideration.
In Game Theory a strategy is a rule which prescribes (perhaps probabilistically) a player’s
next move in every instance he might have to move. A pure, or deterministic strategy is a
function σn : H∗ → A
n which assigns a move in the player’s action set to each finite-length
history. That is,
∀h = (s0, s1, s2, ..., st) ∈ H∗ ∃a
n ∈ An(st) : σ
n (h) = an.
It is well known that there is no loss of generality in assuming that each player at the start of
the game selects a deterministic strategy σn which determines all his subsequent moves (this
is so because Γ3 (G) is a game of perfect information, i.e., at each turn only one player moves
and he knows all the preceding moves). We will only consider legal strategies, that is strategies
which never produce moves outside the player’s closed neighborhood.
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We call a strategy σn positional (or Markovian stationary) if the next move depends only
on the current state of the game (but not on previous states or current time). That is,
∀h = (s0, s1, s2, ..., st) ∈ H∗ : σ
n (h) = σn (st) .
A strategy profile is a triple σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3). We define σ−n = (σm)m∈I\{n}; for instance,
σ−1 = (σ2, σ3). If the strategies σ1, σ2, σ3 are deterministic, we call (σ1, σ2, σ3) a deterministic
profile. A positional profile is defined analogously. If the deterministic profile (σ1, σ2, σ3) applied
to the game Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) results (resp. does not result) in a capture, we call (σ
1, σ2, σ3) a
capturing (resp. non-capturing) profile in Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε).
2.4 Payoffs
To complete the description of Γ3 (G), we must define payoff functions for all players. Each
player will try to maximize his payoff; the payoffs will encapsulate the following facts.
1. The longer the capture time, the less the cops gain and the less the robber loses.
2. The capturing cop gains at least as much as the non-capturing one.
Each player’s payoff function depends, in general, on the entire game history; but, since a
history is fully determined by the initial position s0 = (x
1, x2, x3, p) and the strategy profile
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3), we will write the n-th player’s payoff in any one of the equivalent forms
Qn (s0, s1, s2, ...), Q
n (s0, σ) and Q
n (s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3).
Fix a constant ε ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
and define turn payoffs as follows. For n ∈ {1, 2}, Cn’s payoff is
qn (s) =

1− ε if s ∈ SnC ,
ε if s ∈ SmC with n 6= m,
1
2
if s ∈ S12C ,
0 else.
(3)
R’s turn payoff is
q3 (s) =
{
−1 if s ∈ SC ,
0 else.
(4)
Next, we fix a discounting factor γ ∈ (0, 1) and, for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we define the n-th player’s
total payoff function by
Qn (s0, s1, s2, ...) =
∞∑
t=0
γtqn (st) , (5)
In the rest of the paper we will assume, unless explicitly stated otherwise, that
(γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 = (0, 1)×
[
0,
1
2
]
.
To understand the consequences of (3)-(5), let us first consider the case where (i) TC < ∞
(finite capture time), (ii) ε < 1
2
and (iii) capture is effected by a single cop. Then the players
receive the following payoffs:
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1. the capturing cop receives (1− ε) γTC ;
2. the non-capturing cop receives εγTC ;
3. the robber receives −γTC (i.e., loses γTC ).
We see that the total cops’ reward is equal to the robber’s loss, but it is not divided equally
between the two cops: since ε < 1
2
, the capturing cop receives more than the other one (unless
both cops simultaneously capture the robber). Furthermore, since γ ∈ (0, 1), the robber’s loss
is a decreasing function of capture time TC and he will play so as to maximize TC . Conversely,
the cops have a motive to minimize TC . But, since (1− ε) γ
TC > εγTC , there is an additional
motive for each cop to be the capturing one; there will exist combinations of γ, ε and TC for
which a cop may choose to delay the robber capture in order to ensure that it is effected by
himself (an example will be given in Section 4.3).
Let us also consider briefly several additional scenaria which are obtained for particular
values of TC , γ, ε.
1. If the robber can avoid capture ad infinitum, i.e., if TC =∞, then all players receive zero
payoff. Clearly this is the best outcome for R.
2. Since a single player moves at each turn, it is only possible to have a “double capture” if
R, on his turn, moves into a vertex which is occupied by both C1 and C2. While the rules
of SCAR do not exclude this possibility, clearly it can only result if R plays suboptimally.
In this case each cop will receive equal payoff of γTC/2.
3. When ε = 1
2
(and for any γ ∈ (0, 1)) each cop receives the same payoff whether he
captures R or not; hence one might expect the two cops to collaborate to effect capture in
the shortest possible time as in classic CR played by two cops against one robber; however
this is not always the case, as we shall see in Section 4.
The definition of payoffs completes the description of Γ3 (G|s, γ, ε); it is easily recognized
that it is a discounted stochastic game [7]: (i) it consists of a sequence of one-shot games, where
the game played at any time depends on the previous game played and the actions of the players;
(ii) the total payoff is the time-discounted sum of the one-shot games payoffs.
2.5 Equilibria
In the classic CR game, a basic question is the existence of winning and/or (time) optimal
strategies. As we will see later, SCAR does not necessarily possess optimal strategies; but one
can still look for equilibrium strategy profiles, in which no player has a motive to unilaterally
change his strategy. The prevalent definition of equilibrium is the one due to Nash [18], which we
now present in the general context of N -player stochastic games; the application to three-player
SCAR (and N -player SCAR, as we will see in Section 5) is immediate.
Consider an N -player perfect-information stochastic game starting at state s0. When the
players use the (deterministic) strategy profile σ =
(
σ1, σ2, ..., σN
)
they receive (total) payoffs
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Q1 (s0, σ), Q
2 (s0, σ), ..., Q
N (s0, σ). We say that σ∗ =
(
σ1∗ , σ
2
∗, ..., σ
N
∗
)
is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) iff
∀n, ∀σn : Qn (s0, σ∗) ≥ Q
n
(
s0, σ
n, σ−n∗
)
. (6)
What (6) says is that, when the rest of the players stick to their equilibrium strategies, no player
can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his own; for example, if players 2, 3, ..., N play
σ−1∗ =
(
σ2∗ , ..., σ
N
∗
)
, then the first player cannot increase his payoff by switching from σ1∗ to some
other σ1.3 The following points must be emphasized.
1. A game may possess no NE, or exactly one, or more than one.
2. A NE is a strategy profile; different NE may yield the same payoffs to the players.
3. Different NE may yield different payoffs. The fact that σ∗ is a NE does not imply that
the corresponding payoff is the best a player can achieve; if more than one players change
their strategies, they may achieve better payoffs than the ones implied by a NE. In other
words, a NE is not necessarily an optimal solution.
3 Modified CR from a Game Theoretic Point of View
Before embarking on the study of SCAR, it will be useful to present a game theoretic formulation
of the following, modified CR game.
1. The game is played by two players: the cop player controls N−1 cop tokens (with N ≥ 2)
and the robber player controls a single robber token.
2. States, movement rules, histories and capture time are defined in exactly the same way as
those of SCAR.
3. The same is true for strategies except for the fact that the cop player’s strategy is of the
form
(
σ1, ..., σN−1
)
, i.e., it contains one strategy for each of his tokens.
4. The cop (resp. robber) player’s payoff is γTC (resp. −γTC ); if TC =∞, both players receive
zero payoff.
It can be easily seen that this is a two-player, zero-sum, discounted stochastic game. It only
differs from the classic CR game, played with N − 1 cops and one robber, in the following.
1. In modified CR, the cop (resp. robber) player tries to maximize (resp. minimize) γTC ; this
is obviously equivalent to classic CR, where the cop (resp. robber) player tries to minimize
(resp. maximize) TC .
2. In modified CR, time is counted in turns, while in classic CR it is counted in rounds, where
each round consists of one move for each player. This is roughly equivalent to a rescaling
of time by the factor 1/N .
3The definition of NE can be extended to games of non-perfect information, provided the σn’s are understood
as probabilistic strategies and the Qn’s as expected payoffs. We will not need these generalizations in the current
paper.
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3. In classic CR, the players select their initial positions, while in modified CR the initial
position is predetermined. It is easy to recover this aspect of classic CR by adding to
modified CR a “placement turn” for each player; this change would have no major impact
on the essential features of the game such as the existence of value and optimal strategies.
Using standard results [7, Section 4.3] we see that modified CR has a value, which in fact is
proportional to the logarithm of capture time, and both players have optimal positional strate-
gies.
As already mentioned, we can assume that the cop (resp. robber) player tries to minimize
(resp. maximize) the capture time. Let TN (G|s0) be the capture time when the cop player has
N − 1 tokens and both players play optimally (note the dependence on the initial position s0).
Hence, if TN (G|s0) is finite (resp. infinite) then the cop’s (resp. robber’s) optimal strategies are
winning (for the respective player).
We denote the maximum value of optimal capture time over all starting positions by
TN (G) = max
s0
TN (G|s0) .
Assuming the game is played with N − 1 cops and one robber, it is easily seen that:
1. if TN (G) < ∞, then the cop player has an (optimal) winning strategy for every starting
position;
2. for every starting position, assuming subsequent optimal play by the cop player (but not
necessarily by the robber player), the capture time is less than or equal to TN (G).
The cop number of a graph G is denoted by c (G) and defined to be the smallest number
of cop tokens which guarantees finite capture time (i.e., one less than the smallest N for which
TN (G) <∞). We call G cop-win if any of the following equivalent conditions holds:
1. capture time is finite for CR on G with one optimally played cop token;
2. T2 (G) <∞;
3. c (G) = 1.
In light of the above remarks, it is clear that all essential aspects of the classic CR are
captured by the modified CR. In the rest of the paper, the term “CR game” will denote the
modified game (unless we specifically use the term “classic CR”).
Finally note that, when N = 3 (two cops vs. one robber) the modified two-cops CR is
path-equivalent to Γ3 (G), by which we mean the following. Take any strategies σ
1, σ2, σ3 and,
starting from the same position s0, apply them to:
1. Γ3 (G), with σ
n being the strategy of the n-th player;
2. the modified two-cops CR, with σ1 (resp. σ2) being the strategy the cop player uses for
his first (resp. second) token, and σ3 being the strategy the robber player uses.
Then it is clear that the same infinite history will be produced in both games.
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4 Three-Player SCAR
In this section we study Γ3 (G) and prove that it always has both positional and non-positional
NE; we also study the connection between classic cop number and existence of capturing NE.
4.1 Existence of a Positional NE
First we prove the existence of at least one positional NE in deterministic strategies for Γ3 (G).
Theorem 4.1 For every graph G and for every s0 ∈ S, (γ, ε) ∈ Ω
3 the game Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) has
a deterministic positional NE. More specifically, there exists a deterministic positional profile
σ∗ = (σ
1
∗, σ
2
∗ , σ
3
∗) such that
∀n, ∀s0, ∀σ
n : Qn
(
s0, σ
n
∗ , σ
−n
∗
)
≥ Qn
(
s0, σ
n, σ−n∗
)
. (7)
For every s and n let un (s) = Qn (s, σ∗). Then the following equations are satisfied
∀n, ∀s ∈ Sn : σn∗ (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] , (8)
∀n,m, ∀s ∈ Sn : um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σn∗ (s))) . (9)
Proof. Fink has proved in [8] that every N -player discounted stochastic game has a positional
NE in probabilistic positional strategies. Fink’s results apply to the general game, with simulta-
neous moves by all players and probabilistic strategies and state transitions; he proves that the
following equations4 must be satisfied at equilibrium for all m ∈ {1, 2, 3} and s ∈ S:
u
m (s) = max
pim(s)
∑
a1∈A1(s)
∑
a2∈A2(s)
∑
a3∈A3(s)
pi1
(
a1|s
)
pi2
(
a2|s
)
pi3
(
a3|s
) [
qm (s) + γ
∑
s′
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, a2, a3
)
u
m (s′)
]
,
(10)
where
1. um (s) is the expected value of um (s);
2. pim(aj |s) is the probability that, given the current state is s, the m-th player plays aj;
3. pim(s) = (pim(am|s))am∈Am(s) is the vector of all probabilities (i.e., for all available actions);
4. Pr (s′|s, a1, a2, a3) is the probability that the next state is s′, given the current state is s
and the players actions a1, a2, a3.
Now choose any n and any s ∈ Sn. For all m 6= n, the m-th player has a single move, i.e., we
have Am (s) = {am}, and so pim(am|s) = 1. Also, since transitions are deterministic,∑
s′
Pr
(
s′|s, a1, a2, a3
)
u
n (s′) = un (T (s, an)) .
4We have adapted Fink’s notation to our own, so as to fit the Γ3 (G) context.
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Hence, for m = n, (10) becomes
u
n (s) = max
pin(s)
∑
an∈An(s)
pin (an|s) [qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (11)
Furthermore let us define σn∗ (s) (for the specific s and n) by
σn∗ (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] . (12)
If more than one state satisfy (12), we set σn∗ (s) to one of these states arbitrarily. Then, to
maximize the sum in (11) the n-th player must set pin (σn∗ (s) |s) = 1 and pi
n (an|s) = 0 for all
an 6= σn∗ (s). Since this is true for all states and players (i.e., every player can, without loss, use
deterministic strategies) we also have un (s) = un (s). Hence (11) becomes
un (s) = max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] = qn (s) + γun (T (s, σn∗ (s))) . (13)
For m 6= n, the m-th player has no choice of action (i.e., σm∗ (s) is the unique element of A
m (s))
and (11) becomes
um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σn∗ (s))) . (14)
We recognize that (12)-(14) are (8)-(9). Also, (12) defines σn∗ (s) for every n and s and so we
have obtained the required deterministic positional strategies σ∗ = (σ
1
∗ , σ
2
∗, σ
3
∗).
Note that the initial state s0 plays no special role in the system (8)-(9). In other words,
using the notation u (s) = (u1 (s) , u2 (s) , u3 (s)) and u = (u (s))s∈S (with the G dependence
suppressed) we see that u and σ∗ are the same for every starting position s0 (i.e., for every
Γ (G|s0)). Also note that, because of the structure of the payoffs, if Γ (G|s0) at some time t1
reaches state s1, the “remainder” game which is played from t1 onward is equivalent (modulo
a payoff rescaling) to Γ (G|s1). From these observations follows that, if the players use σ∗ in
Γ (G|s0) and at some time t1 > 0 the game reaches s1, then σ∗ is an positional NE for both
Γ (G|s0) and Γ (G|s1); the payoffs to the players are u (s0) in the former and u (s1) in the latter.
Let us also note that Theorem 4.1 in fact holds for any ε ∈ [0, 1]; we have confined attention
to the case ε ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
to represent the intuition that the capturing cop’s reward should be at
least as large as that of the non-capturing one’s.
4.2 Existence of Non-positional NE
Next we prove that Γ3 (G|s0) also has deterministic NE which are not positional. To this end we
follow an approach which has previously been used for several other N -player games of perfect
information [4, 5, 23], namely the use of threat strategies.
We start by introducing, for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the auxiliary games Γn3 (G|s0); these are two-player,
zero-sum, perfect-information games with movement sequence, states, action sets, capturing
conditions etc. being the same as in Γ3 (G|s0). However, in Γ
n
3 (G|s0) player Pn controls token
n and has payoff Qn; and player P−n controls tokens {1, 2, 3} \ {n} and has payoff −Q
n. More
specifically, the following hold.
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1. Γ33 (G|s0) (played on G with initial state s0) is the game where P3, controlling R, plays
against P−3, controlling C1 and C2; P−3 has reward (and P3 has penalty) equal to
γTC : when either C1 or C2 captures R,
0 : when R is not captured.
It is easily seen that Γ33 (G|s0) is the two-cops, one-robber modified CR game.
2. Γ13 (G|s0) (played on G with initial state s0) is the game in which P1, controlling C1, plays
against P−1, controlling R and a “robber-friendly” C2; P1 receives reward (and P−1 receives
penalty) equal to
(1− ε) γTC : when C1 captures R,
εγTC : when C2 captures R,
0 : when R is not captured.
3. Γ23 (G|s0) is similar to Γ
1
3 (G|s0), with the roles of C1 and C2 interchanged.
It can be seen that in Γ13 (G|s) an optimal action plan for P−1 is
1. when c(G) = 1: C2 and R meet in the longest possible time but before R is caught by C1;
2. when c (G) > 1 and C1 cannot alone capture R (when the game starts at s0): C2 always
avoids R and R always avoids both C1 and C2.
Using the terminology and results of [7] we see that: for every n ∈ {1, 2, 3} and s0 ∈ S,
Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is a two-player, zero-sum discounted stochastic game with perfect information.
Hence standard results [7, Section 4.3] give the following.
Lemma 4.2 For each n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, s0 ∈ S and (γ, ε) ∈ Ω
3, the game Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε) has a value
and the players have optimal deterministic positional strategies.
Returning to Γ3 (G|s), the threat strategies are as follows. The n-th player plays the strategy
which is optimal for Pn in Γ
n
3 (G|s), as long as the other players do the same. If at some point
player m deviates5 from the above, then the n-th player (with n ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {m}) adopts the
strategy which P−m uses for the n-th token in Γ
m
3 (G|s). In other words, the threat strategy σ
n
for the n-th player is “composed” by strategies φnm as follows:
σn =
{
φnn as long as every player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n follows φ
m
m;
φnm as soon as some player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n “deviates” from φ
m
m,
(15)
where, in the game Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε) :
1. φnn is an optimal strategy of Pn against P−n;
5We say that a player “deviates” from a strategy if he plays a move different from the one prescribed by
this strategy; since the game has perfect information, this deviation will be immediately detected by the other
players.
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2. φmn (for m 6= n) is an optimal strategy used (for the m-th token) by P−n against Pn.
Since the φmn ’s are positional they do not depend on the starting state s0; in fact the same φ
m
n
is optimal for every s0 and corresponding game Γ
n
3 (G|s0). We now show that, for every s0,
σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) is a NE of Γ3 (G|s0).
Theorem 4.3 For every graph G, (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 and s0 ∈ S in the game Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) we have
∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} , ∀σn : Qn
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3
)
≥ Qn(s0, σ
n, σ−n) (16)
where σn (for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}) is a strategy of the form defined in (15).
Proof. Recall that we can write payoffs in any of the equivalent forms:Qn (s0, σ), Q
n (s0, s1, s2, ...),
Qn (h) (where h = (s0, s1, s2,....)).
We choose some initial state s and fix it for the rest of the proof. Now let us prove (16) for
the case n = 1. In other words, we need to show that
∀σ1 : Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3) ≥ Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3). (17)
We take any σ1 and let
ĥ = (ŝ0, ŝ1, ŝ2, ...) be the history produced by (σ
1, σ2, σ3) and initial state ŝ0 = s,
h˜ = (s˜0, s˜1, s˜2, ...) be the history produced by (σ
1, σ2, σ3) and initial state s˜0 = s = ŝ0.
We also define T1 as the earliest time in which (σ
1, σ2, σ3) produce different states:
T1 = min {t : s˜t 6= ŝt} .
If T1 =∞, then h˜ = ĥ and (17) holds with equality:
Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3) = Q1(ĥ) = Q1(h˜) = Q1(σ1, σ2, σ3). (18)
If T1 <∞, then at t = T1 player 1 deviated from φ
1
1, the first difference in states appeared and
it was detected by players 2 and 3, who switched to φ21 and φ
3
1, respectively. We have
Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3) = Q1(ĥ) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (ŝt) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt) , (19)
Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3) = Q1(h˜) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) +
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (s˜t) . (20)
Since s˜t = ŝt for every t < T1, it suffices to compare the second sums of (19) and (20). In what
follows we let s∗ = ŝT1−1 = s˜T1−1.
1. Consider first ĥ = (ŝ0, ŝ1, ŝ2, ...). It is produced by σ = (σ
1, σ2, σ3) which means that
the entire ĥ is actually produced by (φ11, φ
2
2, φ
3
3). Since every φ
m
m is positional, the history
13
(ŝ0, ŝ1, ..., ŝT1−2) does not influence the moves produced at times T1, T1 + 1, .... Hence we
have
∞∑
t=T1−1
γtq1 (ŝt) = γ
T1−1
∞∑
t=0
γtq1 (ŝT1−1+t) = γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
2, φ
3
3). (21)
In other words, the sum in (21) is proportional to the payoff of player 1 in Γ3 (G|s
∗) when
each player n ∈ {1, 2, 3} uses strategy φnn. But Q
1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
2, φ
3
3) is also the payoff of P1 in
Γ13 (G|s
∗) (which starts at s∗) with P1 playing φ
1
1 and P−1 playing (φ
2
2, φ
3
3). However, in
Γ13 (G|s
∗) the optimal strategy of P−1 is (φ
2
1, φ
3
1); hence we have the following
γT1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
2, φ
3
3) ≥ γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
1, φ
3
1). (22)
2. Next consider h˜ = (s˜0, s˜1, s˜2, ...). It is produced by (σ
1, σ2, σ3) and, since σ1 is not nec-
essarily positional, s˜T1 , s˜T1+1, s˜T1+2... could depend on (s˜0, s˜1, ..., s˜T1−2). However, we can
introduce the strategy ρ1 induced by σ1 on the game starting at s∗, which will produce the
same history (s˜T1 , s˜T1+1, s˜T1+2, ...) as σ
1.6 Then, from the optimality of φ11 as a response
to (φ21, φ
3
1) in Γ
1
3 (G|s
∗), we have
∞∑
t=T1−1
q1 (s˜t) = γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, ρ1, φ21, φ
3
1) ≤ γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
1, φ
3
1). (23)
Combining (19)-(23) we have:
Q1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3) =
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) + γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, ρ1, φ21, φ
3
1) ≤
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (s˜t) + γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
1, φ
3
1)
≤
T1−2∑
t=0
γtq1 (ŝt) + γ
T1−1Q1(s∗, φ11, φ
2
2, φ
3
3) = Q
1(s, σ1, σ2, σ3)
and we have proved (17), which is (16) for n = 1. The proof for the cases n = 2 and n = 3 are
similar and hence omitted.
The strategies (σ1, σ2, σ3) are not positional. In particular, the action of a player at time t
may be influenced by the action (deviation) performed by another player at time t− 2. Hence,
(σ1, σ2, σ3) is a non-positional NE.
Just like Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.3 actually holds for any ε ∈ [0, 1].
4.3 Cop Number, Capturing and Non-capturing NE
In this section we examine the connection of c (G) to the existence of capturing and non-capturing
NE in Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε).
Theorem 4.4 For any G with c (G) = 1 the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3, ∀s0 ∈ S : every NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is capturing.
6We define ρ1 such that, when combined with s˜T1−1, φ
2
1, φ
3
1, will produce the same history (s˜T1 , s˜T1+1, s˜T1+2, ...)
as σ1. Note that ρ1 will in general depend (in an indirect way) on (s˜0, s˜1, ..., s˜T1−2).
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Proof. Suppose c (G) = 1, take any s0 ∈ SNC (the case s0 ∈ SC is trivial) and let (σ
1, σ2, σ3)
be a NE of Γ (G|s0). Suppose it is a non-capturing NE; then we have
∀ρ1 : 0 = Q1(s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3) ≥ Q1(s0, ρ
1, σ2, σ3). (24)
Now take σ̂1 to be an optimal cop strategy in CR with one cop7. In this game, since c (G) = 1,
C1 will capture R in some finite time, which will depend on R’s strategy but will be bounded
above by the T2 (G) defined in Section 3. When C1 uses σ̂
1 in Γ3 (G|s0), C2 may influence the
game by capturing R no later than C1. Hence we have the following possibilities.
1. C1 captures R at some time T1.
2. C2 captures R before C1, i.e., at some time T2 < T1.
3. C1 and C2 capture R simultaneously at some time T12.
At any rate, we will have max (T1, T2, T12)≤ T2 (G) <∞. Hence C1 will receive payoffQ
1(s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ3)
which will satisfy
Q1(s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ3) ≥ min
(
γT1 (1− ε) , γT2ε, γT12
1
2
)
> 0. (25)
But (25) contradicts (24); hence (σ1, σ2, σ3) must be a capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0). We conclude
that every NE of Γ3 (G|s0) is capturing.
It might be assumed that Γ3 (G) is equivalent to two one-cop CR games played on the same
graph and, consequently, each cop should use an optimal CR strategy. For example, it might be
assumed that on graphs G with c(G) = 1, if σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3 are time optimal cop and robber strategies
in one-cop CR, then σ̂ = (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is a NE of Γ3 (G). This is not true; in certain cases a cop
may want to delay capture to ensure that it is effected by him, as seen in the following example.
Example 4.5 Suppose Γ3 (G) is played on the graph G of Fig. 4.5 with the initial positions
indicated; C1 has the first move. Further, take ε <
1
2
. Let σ̂n (n ∈ {1, 2}) be an (one-cop) CR
optimal strategy of the n-th cop; in this case it consists in each cop moving towards the robber
at every turn. Now suppose that for these (σ̂1, σ̂2) there exists a NE (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3); it is easily seen
that σ̂3 must be an optimal robber strategy in two-cop CR. If the players used (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) the
game would evolve as follows:
Turn 0 1 2 3 4 5
C1 vertex 6 5 5 5 4 4
C2 vertex 1 1 2 2 2 3
R vertex 4 4 4 3 3 3
7More precisely, define σ̂1 by
∀x1, x2, x3, n : σ̂1
(
x1, x2, x3, n
)
= σ˜1
(
x1, x3, n
)
where σ˜1 is an optimal cop strategy in one-cop CR. We will repeatedly use, without further comment, this
method to produce SCAR strategies from strategies in CR.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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9
C1C2 R
Figure 1: An example where minimizing capture time does not yield a NE.
Note that the robber will move so as to be captured by C2, because this increases capture time
by 1. So the payoffs are
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= γ5ε,
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= γ5 (1− ε) ,
Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= −γ5.
Now, suppose C2, R stick to their strategies, while C1 uses the following strategy σ˜
1: on his first
move he retreats to vertex 7 and afterwards moves directly towards the robber. This frees a
path for R towards 9, which increases the capture time. The game evolves as follows.
Turn 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
C1 vertex 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 8 8 8 9
C2 vertex 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5
R vertex 4 4 4 5 5 5 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9
So the payoffs are
Q1
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= γ13 (1− ε) ,
Q2
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= γ13ε,
Q3
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= −γ13.
It is easy to see that
γ >
(
ε
1− ε
)1/8
⇒ (1− ε) γ13 > εγ5 ⇒ Q1
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
> Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
Since C1 can unilaterally improve his payoff, (σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3) cannot be a NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε).
We now move to graphs with cop number greater than one.
Theorem 4.6 For any G with c (G) = 2 the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3, ∀s0 ∈ S : there exists a capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) .
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Proof. Take any G with c (G) = 2, any (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 and any s0 ∈ SNC (the case s0 ∈ SC is trivial)
and fix them for the rest of the proof. Now take any threat strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3);
according to Theorem 4.3, σ is a NE and it can be either capturing or non-capturing. If it
is capturing we are done; let us then suppose that σ is non-capturing. Recall that, for all
n ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
σn =
{
φnn as long as every player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n follows φ
m
m;
φnm as soon as some player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n deviates from φ
m
m,
where in the game Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε):
1. φnn is an optimal strategy of Pn against P−n;
2. φmn (for m 6= n) is an optimal strategy used (for the m-th token) by P−n against Pn.
As mentioned, when σ is used in Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) the n-th player (for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) will follow
strategy φnn for the entire game. We will now construct a new profile σ˜ = (σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ˜3) which
will be a capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε). To this end we first select an optimal strategy profile
σ̂ = (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) in the two-cops CR; since c (G) = 2, σ̂ will be capturing for every s0. Then, for
each n ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we let
σ˜n =
{
σ̂n as long as every player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n follows σ̂m;
φnm as soon as some player m ∈ {1, 2, 3} \n deviates from σ̂
m.
The φnm’s above are the same as in σ. Hence, to show that σ˜ is of the form prescribed by
Theorem 4.3, we have to show that each σ̂n is optimal in the corresponding Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε). In
the following arguments we will repeatedly use the (easily verified) fact that Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is
path-equivalent to Γn3 (G|s0, γ, ε) for every n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
1. First consider C1 playing φ
1
1 in Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε); since by assumption σ is non-capturing in
Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε), it is also non-capturing in Γ
1
3 (G|s0, γ, ε). Hence C1 playing φ
1
1 against φ
2
2
and φ33 will receive a payoff of zero, in both Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) and Γ
1
3 (G|s0, γ, ε). But then
C1 playing φ
1
1 against φ
2
1 and φ
3
1 (which are optimal in Γ
1
3 (G|s0, γ, ε)) will also receive a
payoff of zero. It follows that C1’s optimal payoff in Γ
1
3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is zero and hence any
strategy is optimal for him in Γ13 (G|s0, γ, ε) and so is, in particular, σ̂
1.
2. By a similar argument, any strategy, and in particular σ̂2, will be optimal for C2 in
Γ23 (G|s0, γ, ε).
3. Finally, the game Γ33 (G|s0, γ, ε) is the two-cop CR, and hence σ̂
3 will be optimal for R in
Γ33 (G|s0, γ, ε).
Using the above observations we see that, according to Theorem 4.3, σ˜ is a NE (in threat
strategies) of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε). Furthermore, playing σ˜ at equilibrium is equivalent to playing σ̂,
a capturing profile in both Γ33 (G|s0, γ, ε) (i.e., two-cop CR) and Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε). Hence σ˜ is a
capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε).
Remark 4.7 Note that the NE of the above theorem is not positional.
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The next theorem holds on a restricted set of (γ, ε) values:
Ω˜3 =
{
(γ, ε) : γ ∈ (0, 1) , ε ∈
[
0,
1
2
]
, γ <
ε
1− ε
}
.
Theorem 4.8 For any G with c (G) = 2, let σ̂ = (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) be an optimal strategy profile in
the two-cop CR game. Then the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω˜3, ∀s0 ∈ S : σ̂ is a capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) .
Proof. Take any G with c (G) = 2, any (γ, ε) ∈ Ω˜3 and any (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) which is optimal in the
two-cop CR game; we fix these for the rest of the proof. Obviously σ̂ is a capturing profile, since
it is optimal in CR and c (G) = 2. So we need to show that it is also a NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε). This
will obviously be true when s0 ∈ SC , so let us consider any s0 ∈ SNC . Let T1 be the capture
time corresponding to (s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3). This is the same in both CR and Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε), since the
two games are path-equivalent.
Assume for the time being that the capturing cop is C1; then the payoffs are
Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= (1− ε) γT1 ,
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= εγT1 ,
Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
= −γT1 .
We will show that no player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
1. Suppose R uses some strategy σ3 and the capture time of (s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3) is T2. By the
optimality (in CR) of σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3, we have T2 ≤ T1 and so
Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ3
)
= −γT2 ≤ −γT1 = Q3
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
So R has no motive to deviate from σ̂3.
2. Similarly, suppose C1 uses some strategy σ
1 and the capture time of (s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is T2;
if T2 = ∞ we have no capture; otherwise capture can be effected by either C1 or C2. At
any rate, by the optimality of (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3), we have T2 ≥ T1 and the maximum possible
payoff to C1 is (1− ε) γ
T2 . Since
Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≤ (1− ε) γT2 ≤ (1− ε) γT1 = Q1
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
,
C1 has no motive to deviate from σ̂
1.
3. Finally, suppose C2 uses some strategy σ
2 and the capture time of (s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3) is T2. If
T2 = ∞ we have no capture; otherwise capture can be effected by either C1 or C2. If we
have no capture then
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= 0 < εγT1 = Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
If capture is effected by C1, we have T2 ≥ T1 and
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= εγT2 ≤ εγT1 = Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
.
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Finally, if capture is effected by C2, we have T2 ≥ T1 + 1 (if C2 could capture before C1
this would be achieved by (s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3)) and, since (γ, ε) ∈ Ω˜3 implies γ < ε
1−ε
, we have
Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= (1− ε) γT2 ≤ (1− ε) γT1+1 < εγT1 .
In every case, C2 has no motive to deviate from σ̂
2.
Having assumed that the starting position s0 and the strategy profile(σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3) result in
a capture by C1, we have shown that no player has a motive to change his strategy. By an
analogous argument, the same holds when (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) results in a capture by C2 . As already
mentioned, (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is a capturing profile, hence some cop will capture the robber, and no
player has a motive to unilaterally change his strategy. Consequently (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is a capturing
NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε).
Remark 4.9 Note that in the above Theorem the NE (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is positional.
We also have the following.
Theorem 4.10 For any G with c (G) ≥ 2, the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3, ∃s0 ∈ S : there exists a non-capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) .
Proof. Choose an s0 = (x, x, y, 1) of the following form: x can be any vertex of G and y is such
that, when the one-cop CR is started from s′0 = (x, y, 1), the robber can avoid capture (such an
s0 will always exist, since c (G) ≥ 2). The strategies are chosen as follows.
1. R’s strategy σ̂3 is the following:
(a) as long as C1, C2 stay in place R also stays in place;
(b) if at some time C1 (resp. C2) is the first cop to move, R starts playing an optimal
one-cop CR strategy which corresponds to the C1 (resp. C2) moves.
2. C1’s strategy σ˜
1 is defined as follows:
(a) if C1 and C2 are in the same vertex, C1 stays in place;
(b) if C1 and C2 are in different vertices, C1 moves in a shortest path towards C2.
3. C2’s strategy σ˜
2 is the same as σ˜1, with the roles of C1 and C2 interchanged.
We now show that (σ˜1, σ˜2, σ̂3) is a non-capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε). First, since C1 and C2
start at the same vertex x, by σ˜1, σ˜2 they will never move towards y; hence, under (σ˜1, σ˜2, σ̂3),
R is not captured.
1. Hence Q3 (s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ̂3) = 0 and, clearly, R cannot improve his payoff, i.e.,
∀σ3 : 0 = Q3
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q3
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ3
)
. (26)
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2. Now suppose C1 uses some σ
1 6= σ˜1 by which, at the start of the game, he moves to some
x′ neighbor of x. However, immediately afterwards C2 moves by σ˜
2 to the same x′. In
other words, C1 and C2 essentially move as one cop and, since c (G) ≥ 2 and R plays
optimally, capture will never occur. Hence
∀σ1 : 0 = Q1
(
s0, σ˜
1, σ˜2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q1
(
s0, σ
1, σ˜2, σ̂3
)
= 0. (27)
3. The case of C2 is similar, but attention must be paid to some details. Suppose C2 uses
some σ2 6= σ˜2 by which his frst nontrivial move is to some x′ neighbor of x. After him
moves R and, since he plays optimally, he will never move into a “vulnerable” position; in
particular he will not move into x ∈ N [x′], since then C2 could capture him in CR; hence
R will never run into C1; neither will he be captured by C2, since he plays optimally. So
∀σ2 : 0 = Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ̂2, σ̂3
)
≥ Q2
(
s0, σ̂
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= 0. (28)
Combining (26)-(28) we see that σ̂ = (σ̂1, σ̂2, σ̂3) is a non-capturing NE of Γ3 (G|s0).
The above result is rather surprising when G has c (G) = 2: while in CR played on G two
optimally playing (and cooperating) cops always capture the robber, in SCAR played on the
same graph there exist non-capturing NE (even when ε = 1
2
, the cops’ interests coincide and
they have the motive to cooperate fully).
On the other hand, the result is not suprprising when applied to G’s with c (G) ≥ 3. In fact,
in this case Theorem 4.10 can be strengthened significantly: there will always exist some state
with only non-capturing NE8.
Theorem 4.11 For any G with c (G) ≥ 3 the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3, ∃s0 ∈ S : every NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is non-capturing.
Proof. Choose an s0 = (x, y, z, 1) such that in the two-cop CR started from s0 the robber can
avoid capture; this can always be achieved, since c (G) ≥ 3, provided R uses an optimal (in
two-cop CR) strategy σ̂3. Also take any cop strategies σ1, σ2. Then the profile (σ1, σ2, σ̂3) will
not result in capture, in either two-cop CR or in Γ3 (G|s0). The Γ3 (G|s0) payoffs will be
∀σ1, σ2, ∀n ∈ {1, 2, 3} : Qn
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ̂3
)
= 0.
Clearly, no player can improve his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Hence, for
every σ1, σ2, (σ1, σ2, σ̂3) is a non-capturing NE in Γ3 (G|s0). On the other hand, take any NE
(σ1, σ2, σ3) of Γ3 (G|s0); then we must have
Q3
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, σ3
)
= 0
because otherwise R could use σ̂3 and unilaterally improve his payoff. Hence every NE (σ1, σ2, σ3)
of Γ3 (G|s0) is non-capturing.
The following corollary illuminates the connection of capturing and non-capturing NE of
Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) to the classic cop number. The first part of the corollary is obtained from Theorem
4.10; the second from Theorems 4.4 and 4.6.
8However, we still have initial positions with capturing NE; e.g., when all players start at the same vertex.
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Corollary 4.12 Given a graph G:
1. suppose that for all (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 and s0 ∈ S, every NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is capturing; then
c (G) = 1.
2. suppose that for all (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 there exists some s0 ∈ S such that every NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε)
is non-capturing; then c (G) ≥ 3.
Finally, combining Theorem 4.4 and the first part of Corollary 4.12 we get the following.
Corollary 4.13 G is cop-win iff : for all (γ, ε) ∈ Ω3 and s0 ∈ S, every NE of Γ3 (G|s0, γ, ε) is
capturing.
5 N-Player SCAR
5.1 Preliminaries
The generalization of Γ3 (G) to ΓN (G), i.e., the N -player SCAR game is straightforward. For
any N ≥ 2, ΓN (G) is played by N − 1 cops (denoted by C1, ..., CN−1) and a robber (denoted
by R) who move along the edges of G. 9 The game starts from a prescribed initial position
s0 and is played in turns, with a single player moving at every turn; the moving sequence is
... → C1 → C2 → ... → CN−1 → R → .... The following briefly presented quantities are
straightforward generalizations of those defined in Section 2.
The player set is I = {1, 2, ..., N} or I = {C1, C2, ..., CN−1, R}. A game position or state has
the form s =
(
x1, x2, ..., xN , p
)
, where xn denotes the position of the n-th player and p denotes
the player who has the next move. For n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, set
Sn =
{
s =
(
x1, ..., xN , n
)
: (x1, ..., xN) ∈ V N and n ∈ I
}
is the set of states where player n has the next move. The set S of all states of the game is
S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ ... ∪ SN ∪ {τ} ,
where τ is as before the terminal state and the set S ′ = S\ {τ} is the set of non-terminal states.
We also define the set SC of capture states and the set SNC of non-capture states as follows:
SC := {s = (x
1, x2, ..., xN , n) ∈ S ′ : ∃i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1} : xi = xN},
SNC := {s = (x
1, x2, ..., xN , n) ∈ S ′ : ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1} xi 6= xN }.
An alternative partition of S is therefore
S = SC ∪ SNC ∪ {τ} .
Moreover, and since we can have simultaneous captures by any subset {n1, n2, ...} of {1, 2, ...,
N − 1}, we define sets Sn1C , S
n1n2
C , ..., S
12...N−1
C analogously to the sets S
1
C , S
2
C , S
12
C ; the union of
all these sets is of course SC .
9Note that the case N = 2, i.e., one cop vs. one robber, is also included in the formulation.
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Action sets An(s) and the transition function T (s, a) are defined in a similar fashion as in
Section 2. In case at time t the state is st =
(
x1t , x
2
t , ..., x
N
t , n
)
∈ Sn and at time t+ 1 the move
by player n is ant+1 ∈ A
n(st), then we use again the shorthand
st+1 = T
(
st, a
n
t+1
)
.
Capture time TC , histories and strategies are also defined analogously to Section 2. The
same is true for payoffs. Specifically, at every non-capture state st ∈ SNC ∪ {τ}, the immediate
reward to each player qn(st) is zero; at every state st ∈ S
n1...nN1
C (i.e., when capture is effected
by N1 cops) the robber’s loss is ε and this is distributed between the N − 1 cops as follows.
1. When 1 ≤ N1 ≤ N − 2: each capturing (resp. non-capturing) cop receives an immediate
reward of 1−ε
N1
(resp. ε
N−N1−1
).
2. When N1 = N − 1: all cops are capturing and each receives an immediate reward of
1
N−1
.
The total payoff of player n is Qn (s0, s1, s2, ...) =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tqn (st). The (γ, ε) sets now are
ΩN =
{
(γ, ε) : γ ∈ (0, 1) , ε ∈
[
0,
1
N − 1
]}
= (0, 1)×
[
0,
1
N − 1
]
,
Ω˜N =
{
(γ, ε) : γ ∈ (0, 1) , ε ∈
[
0,
1
N − 1
]
, γ <
ε
1− ε
}
.
The choice ε ∈
[
0, 1
N−1
]
ensures satisfaction of the intuitive requirement that capturing cops
should get at least as much as non-capturing ones:
ε ≤
1
N − 1
⇒
(
∀N1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 2} : ε ≤
N − 1− (N − 2)
N − 1
≤
N − 1−N1
N − 1
)
⇒ (∀N1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 2} : ε (N − 1) ≤ N − 1−N1)
⇒ (∀N1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 2} : εN1 ≤ (1− ε) (N − 1−N1))
⇒
(
∀N1 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 2} :
ε
N − 1−N1
≤
1− ε
N1
)
.
In addition, again agreeing with our intuition, each capturing cop’s reward is a decreasing
function of N1. Indeed, when 1 ≤ N1 ≤ N − 2, their reward is
1−ε
N1
which is decreasing in N1,
with minimum value achieved at N1 = N − 2 and equal to
1−ε
N−2
; and when N1 = N − 1 (all cops
are capturing) we have:
ε ≤
1
N − 1
⇒
1− ε
N − 2
≥
1− 1
N−1
N − 2
=
1
N − 1
.
In short, the fewer capturing cops we have, the more is each of them rewarded.
It is however worth noting that under Nash equilibrium we will always have a single capturing
cop: the only way to have multiple capturing cops is if the robber moves into a cop-occupied
vertex. This he will never do in NE (where he wants to maximize capture time) since he can
always postpone capture by staying in place.
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5.2 Existence of NE
The next theorem shows the existence of positional NE for every ΓN (G|s0). It generalizes
Theorem 4.1 and is proved very similarly; hence the proof is omitted.
Theorem 5.1 For every graph G and for every s0 ∈ S, (γ, ε) ∈ Ω
N the game ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε)
has deterministic positional NE. Specifically, there exists a deterministic positional profile σ∗ =(
σ1∗, σ
2
∗, ..., σ
N
∗
)
such that
∀n, ∀s0, ∀σ
n : Qn
(
s0, σ
n
∗ , σ
−n
∗
)
≥ Qn
(
s0, σ
n, σ−n∗
)
. (29)
For every s and n, let un (s) = Qn (s, σ∗). Then the following equations are satisfied
∀n, ∀s ∈ Sn : σn∗ (s) = arg max
an∈An(s)
[qn (s) + γun (T (s, an))] , (30)
∀n,m, ∀s ∈ Sn : um (s) = qm (s) + γum (T (s, σn∗ (s))) . (31)
The next theorem generalizes Theorem 4.3 and shows that every ΓN (G|s0) has NE which are
not positional. The proof (which is similar to that of Theorem 4.3 and hence will be omitted)
depends on auxiliary two-player zero-sum games Γ1N (G|s0), ..., Γ
N
N (G|s0), where Γ
n
N (G|s0) is the
two-player game with initial state s0 in which Pn (who has payoffQ
n) plays against P−n (who has
payoff −Qn and controls {1, 2, ..., N} \ {n}). Similarly to the 3-player case, for each s ∈ S and
n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, the game ΓnN (G|s0) has a value and the players have optimal deterministic
positional strategies. Strategies φnn and φ
m
n are as in Section 4. The threat strategy of the n-th
player in the N -player game ΓN (G|s0) is σ
n, defined (exactly as in Section 4) as follows:
σn =
{
φnn as long as every player m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} \n follows φ
m
m;
φnm as soon as some player m ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} \n “deviates” from φ
m
m.
(32)
Keeping the above in mind, we can prove the following.
Theorem 5.2 For every graph G and for every N ≥ 3, s0 ∈ S, (γ, ε) ∈ Ω
N , in the game
ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) we have
∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} , ∀σn : Qn
(
s0, σ
1, σ2, ..., σN
)
≥ Qn(s, σn, σ−n) (33)
where σn (for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}) is a deterministic non-positional strategy of the form (32).
As in 3-player SCAR Γ3 (G|s0), the above hold for any ε ∈ [0, 1], not just for ε ∈
[
0, 1
N−1
]
.
5.3 Cop Number, Capturing and Non-capturing NE
The following results generalize those appearing in Section 4.3 and hold for every N ≥ 2.
Theorem 5.3 For any G with c (G) = 1 the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN , ∀s0 ∈ S : every NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is capturing.
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Theorem 5.4 For any G with c (G) ≤ N − 1 the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN , ∀s0 ∈ S : there exists a capturing NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) .
Theorem 5.5 For any G with c (G) ≤ N −1, let σ̂ =
(
σ̂1, σ̂2, ..., σ̂N
)
be a strategy profile which
is optimal in the (N − 1)-cop CR game. Then the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ Ω˜N , ∀s0 ∈ S : σ̂ is a capturing NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) .
Theorem 5.6 For any G with c (G) ≥ 2, the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN , ∃s0 ∈ S : there exists a non-capturing NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) .
Theorem 5.7 For any G with c (G) ≥ N the following holds:
∀ (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN , ∃s0 ∈ S : every NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is non-capturing.
Corollary 5.8 Given a graph G:
1. suppose that for all (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN and s0 ∈ S, every NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is capturing; then
c (G) = 1.
2. suppose that for all (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN there exists some s0 ∈ S such that every NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε)
is non-capturing; then c (G) ≥ N .
Corollary 5.9 G is cop-win iff : for all (γ, ε) ∈ ΩN and s0 ∈ S, every NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε) is
capturing.
5.4 Selfish Cop Number
We know that the cop number c (G) of graph G is the minimum number of cops required to
guarantee (when the cops play optimally and for any robber strategy and starting position)
capture in CR played on G. Define correspondingly the selfish cop number for the SCAR game.
Definition 5.10 The selfish cop number of a graph G is denoted by cs (G) and defined to be
the smallest K such that: for any (γ, ε) ∈ ΩK+1 and any s0 ∈ S, there exists a capturing NE of
ΓK+1 (G|s0, γ, ε).
The selfish cop number equals the classic one, as demonstrated in the following.
Theorem 5.11 For every graph G we have cs (G) = c (G).
Proof. Take any K such that K ≥ c (G), then by Theorem 5.4 we have that, for every
(γ, ε) ∈ ΩK+1 and every s0 ∈ S there exists a capturing NE of ΓK+1 (G|s0, γ, ε). On the other
hand, take any K ≤ c (G)− 1, then by Theorem 5.7 we have that, for every (γ, ε) ∈ ΩK+1 there
exists some s0 ∈ S, such that there exists no capturing NE of ΓK+1 (G|s0, γ, ε). Hence cs (G)
(i.e., the smallest K such that for every (γ, ε) ∈ ΩK+1 and every s0 ∈ S there exists a capturing
NE of ΓK+1 (G|s0, γ, ε)) equals c (G).
24
5.5 A Connection between CR and SCAR
We will now show that a slightly modified version of N -player SCAR is, in a certain sense,
equivalent to the CR game with N − 1 cops. The modification consists in letting ε be a
function of N and N1, namely we use ε (N,N1) =
N−1−N1
N−1
. We will denote the modified SCAR
game by ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1)).
The modification implies that the payoff of each capturing state depends on the number of
capturing cops. The distribution of the payoff remains the same, i.e.,
1. each capturing cop receives a reward of 1−ε(N,N1)
N1
=
1−
N−1−N1
N−1
N1
= 1
N−1
;
2. each non-capturing cop receives a reward of ε(N,N1)
N−1−N1
=
N−1−N1
N−1
N−1−N1
= 1
N−1
.
In other words, for every capture each cop (whether he is capturing or non-capturing) receives
the same reward.
SCAR with the above modification of ε falls under the general formulation of discounted
stochastic games and all our previous results still hold. Furthermore, the (N − 1)-cops CR
game is payoff-equivalent to ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1)), by which we mean the following. Take any
strategies σ1, σ2, ..., σN and apply them
1. to ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1)), with σ
n being the strategy of the n-th player;
2. to the (N − 1)-cops CR game, with σn (for n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}) being the strategy the
cop player uses for his n-th token, and σN being the strategy the robber player uses.
Then the same history (s0, s1, s2, ...) will be produced in the two games (they are path-equivalent)
and, furthermore, the sum of the total payoffs of the cops (resp. robber) in ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1))
will be the same as the payoff of the cops (resp. robber) in the (N − 1)-cops CR game.
Since all cops in ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1)) receive the same payoff, their interests totally coin-
cide: they all want some cop to capture the robber in the shortest possible time, just like in the
(N − 1)-cops CR game. Hence the following catn be proved in a similar way as Theorems 4.8
and 5.5.
Theorem 5.12 If the profile ((σ̂1, ..., σ̂N−1) , σ̂N) is optimal in the (N − 1)-cops CR game, then
the profile (σ̂1, ..., σ̂N−1, σ̂N ) is a NE of ΓN (G|s0, γ, ε (N,N1)).
6 Conclusion
As we have already mentioned, very little work has been previously done on multi-player pursuit
games. In this sense SCAR furnishes a novel generalization of CR and its numerous two-player
variants. We find especially interesting the following aspects of SCAR.
1. On the “technical” side, the formulation of SCAR as a discounted game is quite advanta-
geous. In the “natural” formulation of a pursuit game, payoff is expected capture time;
since this can be unbounded, there is no obvious way to establish the existence of NE (in
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the multi-player case). On the other hand, in the SCAR formulation payoff is a discounted
constant (see (5)); consequently the existence of a deterministic positional NE follows
immediately from Fink’s classical result. Furthermore, because SCAR is a perfect infor-
mation game, its payoff can be immediately converted to capture time, thus preserving
the semantics of a pursuit game.
2. On the “conceptual” side, our results indicate that (perhaps surprisingly) even when N−1
cops can capture the robber if they cooperate, they may settle on a non-cooperating,
non-capturing Nash equilibrium. This is somewhat similar to the “lack-of-cooperation”
phenomenon observed in other branches of Game Theory (e.g., in Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Tragedy of the Commons).
The above facts indicate further research directions, which we intend to pursue in the future.
We conclude this paper by briefly discussing some such directions.
1. Refinement of equilibria. The apparent paradox of non-capturing Nash equilibria may
be resolved by using more refined equilibria concepts (subgame perfect equilibria, strong
equilibria, admissible equilbria etc.). An obvious target then is to establish the existence
and nature of such equilbria in SCAR.
2. SCAR variants. These are obtained by changing the number and / or behaviors of the
cops and robbers. Some possibilities are listed below; the methods of the current paper
can be used to study the resulting variants.
(a) One cop pursues several selfish robbers; each robber pays a penalty if he is captured
and a (lower, perhaps zero) penalty if another robber is captured. In a sense this is
the dual of the game we have studied in this paper.
(b) More generally, N −M cops pursue M robbers; the payoff of each player may reflect
a completely or partially selfish behavior on his part.
(c) Even more generally, teams of cops pursue teams of robbers; a team is a set of tokens
controlled by a single player.
(d) The robbers can be “passive”: (i) they move on the graph according to predetermined,
known transition functions and (ii) they do not receive any payoff (but their capture
results in payoffs to the capturing and non-capturing cops). Conversely, we can have
active robbers and passive cops.
3. SCAR generalizations. More generally, a family of generalized multi-player pursuit / eva-
sion games on graphs can be obtained by varying the “capture relationship” between
players. Here are two examples.
(a) A game played by players P1, P2, ..., PN , in which Pn pursues Pn+1 (for n ∈
{1, 2, ..., N − 1}); here we have a “linear” pursuit relationship.
(b) The same as above but also PN pursues P1; here we have a “cyclic” pursuit relation-
ship.
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Hence a player will, in general, be simultaneously pursuer and evader. Pursuit relationships
are specified in terms of appropriate player payoffs10, e.g., the capturing (resp. captured)
player receives (resp. pays) one time discounted unit. Again, the resulting games can be
studied by the methods of the current paper.
4. Non-perfect-information games. A more drastic change (which can be used in conjunction
to any of the previously mentioned variations) is to allow for simultaneous or concurrent
player moves. This results in non-perfect-information games and their study will require
more powerful methods than the ones presented in the current paper.
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